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ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE BAGHDAD

PART AREA

US SUBMISSION

June 1, 1958

I. INTRODUCTION

The following report is the US submission for the Liaison Committee meeting to be held at London in July 1958.

II. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST STRATEGY

The most significant event during the period under review was the revival of the sharp dispute between Moscow and Belgrade. The International Communist Movement clearly demonstrated during the first quarter of 1958 an ever increasing concern over the problem which it characterizes as "revisionism". This issue which has manifested itself at many levels of the Communist power structure, both within the Soviet Bloc and in legal and illegal parties in the Free World, involves a challenge to the preeminent role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Extensive discussion and denunciation of revisionism in Party theoretical journals, in Party Congress and Central Committee resolutions, and in the main party newspapers of the Soviet Bloc states has been accompanied in some instances by punitive and disciplinary measures ranging from expulsion of leading Party functionaries and factional groups to tightened Party controls over publications and professional organizations among writers etc.

At the international level, the Yugoslav Party has been the target of steadily intensifying criticism by the CPSU and Satellite Parties. The immediate cause of the Soviet-Yugoslav polemic was the publication on March 22, 1958, of the Yugoslav Party program, which contained an extensive analysis of the state

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of the world and of international communism differing fundamentally from the declaration issued by the twelve Bloc parties in Moscow in November 1957. The Yugoslav program again rejects Soviet claims to leadership of the Bloc and the International Communist Movement. It sees claims of one country to an "ideological monopoly" as a threat to the free internal development of other "socialist" countries and refuses to equate support of the USSR on every issue with loyalty to the general cause of Communism. In reply to this program the Moscow journal Kommunist argued in an article published on April 17, that Moscow's role as the "center of the world revolutionary movement" was determined by historic necessity and insisted on ideological conformity. Moscow also viewed "proletarian internationalism" -- a euphemism for subservience to Moscow -- as the bedrock of relations between Communist-ruled countries and Communist parties, arguing that this principle "under certain conditions" demands the subordination of the national interests of one country to those of the proletarian struggle on a world-wide scale.

The Yugoslav program also contended that the increasing control exercised by states over the economic life of "monopolistic capital" introduces socialist elements into the economies of capitalist countries and facilitates a peaceful, evolutionary transition to socialism in these countries. This emphasis on an evolutionary development was sharply criticized by Moscow as "distracting the attention of the proletariat from the historic task of the revolutionary conquest of power," which, it insists, must be followed by a dictatorship of the proletariat and suppression of the overthrown "exploiting classes." Among criticism of Yugoslavia in the satellites, the most scathing so far came from Communist China in an article in the Peoples Daily of May 3, which reaffirmed the correctness of the June 1948 Cominform resolution condemning the Yugoslav

Party's position and charged Yugoslavia with the aim of "splitting the International Communist Movement."

Stripped of its Communist phraseology this conflict reflects the basic incompatibility of current Soviet and Yugoslav political aims in international affairs. While Moscow seeks tighter central control over the satellites, Belgrade is striving to keep its influence in Eastern European affairs. The dispute also demonstrates Moscow's determination to keep central control of the Bloc. The Soviet announcement on May 28, that the USSR was "postponing" all its economic aid to Yugoslavia for a five year period shows the CPSU's concern with the challenge to its authority, since the action clearly exposes to the countries of Asia and Africa the hollowness of the Soviet assertion that the USSR was giving economic aid "without strings attached." Aside from demonstrating once again the real aims of the Soviet Union and its intent to use the International Communist Movement merely as an instrumentality in the pursuance of these aims, this conflict is likely to prove of significance for subversive activities in the Baghdad Pact area. Yugoslavia has ties with radical elements in a number of the states of the region, and the maintenance of peaceful Yugoslav-Soviet relations over the past three years has encouraged these forces to adopt attitudes toward the USSR which were similar to those of Yugoslavia. In both Syria and Egypt these forces possess considerable political influence. Nasser's announced intention to visit Yugoslavia in July and Prime Minister Nehru's criticism of the Soviet treatment of Yugoslavia also suggest the possibility of future difficulties.

The hardening of the Soviet Union's attitude toward "deviationism" has so far not visibly affected its attitude toward the states of Asia which are outside the Bloc. In the USSR's state-to-state relationship emphasis continues to be placed on development of trade and economic aid. The Soviet reaction to

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the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) illustrates very well the present Soviet strategy in the region. There is ample evidence that the USSR was temporarily disconcerted when, in the creation of the UAR, a close union rather than a loose federal relationship was decided upon. The formation of the UAR was probably regarded by the Soviet Government at least as a temporary setback for its aims in the region since the chance of turning Syria progressively more into a satellite had, at least for the time being, been lost. Moscow's attitude of reserve on the subject of the UAR continued until late March when the Soviets began to approve the UAR and to adjust their relationships to the new situation.

During the Moscow visit of President Gamal Abd al-Nasir in May 1958, the leaders of the Soviet Union showed great cordiality. It is interesting to note, however, that the text of the toast made by Soviet Premier Khrushchev at a Kremlin banquet on May 15, which referred to Soviet support for Arab union under Nasir's leadership, was considerably toned down in a Tass version which referred merely to the "Soviet people" wanting to see "the cohesion" of the Arabs in the fight against "the colonizers." It is also significant that in the Tass version this part of Khrushchev's toast was not given in direct quotation. This seems to indicate that even now the endorsement of the UAR by the Soviet Union is a cautious one and that the USSR does not want the development of genuine Arab unity which it might not be able to manipulate or influence.

Soviet and Bloc representatives have overtly avoided contact with local Communist movements in both regions of the UAR and have outwardly maintained a correct aloofness from internal problems involving relationships between the government and the local Communist parties. Recent developments suggest,

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however, that the International Communist Movement, far from jettisoning the indigenous Communist parties, plans to keep intact at least a disciplined cadre, underground if necessary. At a minimum such a movement could be expected to infiltrate nationalist groups and guide them in the pursuance of anti-Western and anti-Baghdad Pact objectives; at a maximum, the USSR may hope to maintain an organized base from which to generate popular pressures on the UAR in case Nasir and his colleagues should demonstrate too much independence.

Toward the pro-Western Arab states the USSR was directing a carefully balanced combination of open denunciation of their "subordination" to the West and largely unpublicized appeals through diplomatic channels designed to lessen support for the policies currently being followed. In a number of instances the Soviet Union has made attractive offers of economic aid and has urged the establishment of diplomatic relations, where such had not yet been established. Communist parties in these states have been under instructions to join indigenous nationalist-neutralist groups both as individuals and as parties, to encourage collaboration and National Front formation among such groups, and not to insist upon a prominent leadership role within these movements.

The official Soviet attitude toward Iran has remained rather friendly and there have been offers of technical and economic aid. These have so far been unacceptable to Iran except projects for the development for common boundary waters. The official attitude toward Turkey has varied but during the last few months there have been efforts to cultivate Turkish friendship with increased cultural contacts. Nevertheless there have been continued propaganda pressures on both Iran and Turkey, not openly acknowledged as

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manifestations of official Soviet governmental attitudes, such as the agitation for the liberation of the recently executed Khazrov Rusteh and the anti-government Turkish broadcasts initiated from Leipzig in March. Radio Yerevan which is broadcasting in Armenian and Azerbaijani, has been seeking to enlist the sympathy of these important minority groups in the Treaty area.

The principal objective of Soviet Bloc strategy with regard to Pakistan has been to undermine Pakistan's pro-Western alignments and stimulate a trend toward neutralism. In pursuing this objective the Bloc has followed a dual policy of exhibiting a friendly interest and desire to help Pakistan on the one hand, and of making more or less blunt threats of the possible consequences to Pakistan of continuing its present foreign policies.

A recent and striking example of the threatening approach is the Soviet note to the Government of Pakistan in April 1958, protesting US missile bases alleged to exist in Pakistan. It stressed that Pakistan belonged to "alliances which are hostile to the USSR, such as the Baghdad Pact and SEATO" and charged that "launching grounds for guided missiles and aerodromes for strategic aviation bombers... are being erected in Pakistan to be used by the armed forces of the US and other partners of Pakistan in military-political blocs for aggressive purposes." The friendlier approach takes the form of visits to Pakistan by Soviet delegations, invitations to Pakistani leaders to visit the USSR and offers of economic and technical aid.

III. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The goals which the Soviet Union is trying to attain with its present strategy have not changed materially since the last report, although there have been some tactical adjustments to new situations. Among the constant

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factors in Soviet strategic aims are:

- (a) Destruction of security systems such as the Baghdad Pact, which are directed against Soviet and Communist penetration.
- (b) Isolation and intimidation of pro-Western governments or, alternately, persuasion of such governments through a mixture of threats and friendly approaches to adopt a neutralist attitude.
- (c) Elimination of Western political, economic and cultural ties and their replacement by Soviet Bloc ties and influences.
- (d) Continuation of the Soviet Bloc posture as a major source of military supply and advice, most important trade partner and source of economic aid, and a prominent source of cultural influence in the countries of the Pact area.
- (e) Continuation of the Soviet posture as an important source of support and, where possible, as the leading force for "liberation" and other "anti-imperialist" struggles throughout Asia and Africa.

The USSR continues to view these goals as part and parcel of its over all struggle with the West and as contributing to the removal of local obstacles to the establishment of Soviet supremacy in and eventual communization of the Pact area.

IV. METHODS

The methods currently used by the Soviet Bloc also have not changed

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materially since the preparation of the last report. They still include:

- (a) The development of state-to-state relationships as a vehicle for peaceful penetration.
- (b) Continued exploitation through propaganda and international Communist-controlled and influenced organizations of
 - (i) Ultra-nationalism;
 - (ii) Distrust of the West;
 - (iii) Soviet technical achievements and alleged readiness to "come to terms with the West";
 - (iv) Fear of war;
 - (v) "Colonialism";
 - (vi) Afro-Asian sentiment.

With regard to the last-mentioned point, International Communist fronts have moved since early January 1958, to exploit the tactical opportunities offered by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo. Virtually all of these organizations have endorsed the resolutions of that Conference and have announced their intention of supporting the programs approved at the gathering. However, the Conference itself has not yet gathered any major organizational momentum. The Permanent Secretariat, originally scheduled to meet March 1, has not been able to hold its first constituent session. Most of its ten members have not yet arrived. Of the three members, aside from the Egyptian Secretary General, Yusef al-Sih'1, who have taken their seats, the Soviet representative arrived promptly, but the Communist Chinese representative did not arrive until ^{MAY} ~~March~~ 7. Communist front organizations are vigorously promoting Afro-Asian participation in such gatherings as the WFO-sponsored Congress for Disarmament and Peaceful Co-existence to be held in Stockholm in July 1958, and are injecting their national affiliates and more reliable

individual adherents into such derivative Afro-Asian gatherings as the Youth Conference, scheduled to be held in Cairo, and the Economic Conference also to be held in Cairo in December 1958, at the initiative of the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce. The Afro-Asian Writers' Conference to be held in Tashkent in October 1958, is a particularly significant gathering, since it represents the first Afro-Asian approved gathering to be held within the Soviet Bloc.

Since 1955 the International Communist fronts have exercised considerable restraint and have not attempted to control directly the organization of and participation in Afro-Asian gatherings. They have rather worked through reliable individuals and national affiliates in order to generate action and enthusiasm by others, so far with only limited success. Pressure of a political and diplomatic nature is, however, being generated by the Bloc to stimulate these activities and a steady increase in these pressures is considered likely. For example, Khrushchev made it clear during the visit of President Nasser that the USSR had endorsed the resolutions of the Cairo Conference, thus highlighting the fact that the UAR still has to issue an unequivocal endorsement of the same resolutions, particularly those dealing with questions of domestic policy.

V. THREAT TO THE PACT AREA FROM SOVIET PENETRATION AND COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE SURROUNDING REGION.

A. THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

The formation of the UAR has had a significant influence on the status of the Communist Party in Syria and on the steady drift of Syria into the Soviet camp. As in Egypt, the overt activities of the Communist Party have been curtailed and in the field of relations with the Soviet Union the

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direction has shifted completely to President Nasir. Soviet initial silence on the subject of union was paralleled by Syrian Communist and pro-Communist maneuvers and statements aimed at retaining as much autonomy as possible for Syria and in particular preserving, if possible, the system of multiple parties and blocs so essential to the effective use of the Communist unity of action tactics. Khalid Bakdash opposed the dissolution of the political parties in Syria and declared that the Communist Party would not dissolve. This attitude was based in part on the legalistic argument that the Party was not authorized in Syria and therefore could not be dissolved. However, Bakdash left Syria on February 4 and in a statement made in Prague on February 27, 1958, undoubtedly reflected the line currently laid down for the local Communist parties. The statement accepted the formation of the UAR and welcomed Nasir's international posture, but admitted to some reservations about Egypt's internal policies. It also reiterated that the Syrian Communist Party would continue its work notwithstanding the decision of all other Syrian parties to disband.

There is little doubt that the formation of the UAR and the attitude of the Syrian Communist Party toward this event initially has had an adverse effect on the prestige of the Party. From a position of open activity and significant influence on policy formation it has once more been reduced to operating cautiously under the threat of imminent repression. Up to May 1958 these activities have been relatively meager. The Communist newspaper al-Nur is still being published, but it apparently no longer carries official party material which now circulates clandestinely. Al-Nur has resisted recent efforts of Egyptian authorities to consolidate the press of Syria and has

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chosen to run the risk of folding under Egyptian financial and political pressures. The newspaper may be relying on Soviet subsidies to maintain itself. For the foreseeable future the Party will probably concentrate primarily upon clandestine activity and on efforts to infiltrate the National Union and other UAR-approved mass organizations, particularly in the labor and youth fields.

There had been earlier reports of "Titoism" within the Syrian Communist Party and it is possible that this dispute will be sharpened. On the ideological front the renewed conflict between Yugoslavia and the USSR will increase the importance of this issue and locally "nationalist communists" may be disenchanted with the official Communist Party response to the union. However, reports on splits and on defections from the Communist Party should probably be treated with reserve since they might be deliberately exaggerated.

In Egypt the Communist Party has increased its strength and made further advances toward unity. In January 1958 the United Communist Party and the Workers and Peasant Communist Party of Egypt completed arrangements for unification which in effect brought unity to the major Communist factions of Egypt. A violently anti-Nasser dissident Communist faction also emerged at that time. The Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, on its part, appears to have stepped up plans to counteract Communist subversion, but so far action has been minimal. There have been more arrests and trials of minor figures and there has been more stringent control applied to Communist literature entering Egypt.

As during previous periods of review most of the Egyptian Communists have shown themselves more anxious to infiltrate than to overthrow the regime. This state of affairs is likely to continue in the Egyptian as well as Syrian

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sectors as long as Nasir follows international policies acceptable to the Soviet Union. The union between Egypt and Syria was not welcomed by the Egyptian party leaders but they too did not take any action against it. They have accommodated themselves to the new conditions and like the Syrians appear to be concentrating on demands for the "democratization" of UAR institutions. The formation of the UAR has revived talk of union between the Syrian and Egyptian parties which had been considered already prior to the establishment of the UAR.

The formation of the UAR has suppressed the tensions and maneuverings among the various Syrian political and military factions, but the situation does not appear to have been fully consolidated and jockeying for position is apparently continuing. The strongest advocates of closer relations with the Soviet Union, Khalid al-'Azam and General Afif Bizri, have been eliminated from active politics in Syria. For the time being at least Nasir appears to be in full control of the Syrian scene with the cooperation of Minister of the Interior Sarraj, and able to impose his will.

Nasir's close relations with the Soviet Union have continued during the period under review and were highlighted by his visit to Moscow in May 1958. The joint communique issued on May 15, 1958, expressed the "profound satisfaction" of the two governments "at the development of close and continuously broadened relations between the two countries." The two governments also reaffirmed "their support for the principles proclaimed in Bandung, which continue to unite the peoples of Asia and Africa, attract growing attention of world public opinion, and have been reaffirmed by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo in 1957, which expressed the hopes and aspirations of

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these two continents." The communique also supported the Soviet line with regard to such overall international issues, as nuclear developments and summit meetings. In a speech delivered upon his return to Cairo on May 16, President Nasir stressed the friendship between the UAR and the USSR. He stated that he had gone to the USSR "after having proclaimed the policy of positive neutrality and nonalignment" and asserted that the leaders of the USSR supported him in this policy. At the same time Nasir repeated most of the propaganda themes directed against "imperialism" and Near Eastern governments "subservient to the West" which his regime and the USSR had utilized in the past. These themes have also been played by Egyptian propagandists who generally continue to support close cooperation with the Bloc. In May the Egyptian radio organization joined the Communist-controlled International Broadcasting Organization; Egypt is thus the first non-Bloc country other than Finland to join this body. An unidentified group of Egyptian journalists affiliated in May with the Communist front International Organization of Journalists.

In spite of continued hostile propaganda against the West and governments friendly to the West, Nasir's stress on "non-alignment" and such gestures, before his Moscow trip as his endeavors to solve the problem of compensation to Suez Canal Company shareholders, indicate that he still desires to achieve a relaxation of tensions in his relations with the West, and there are indications that he would like to avoid complete reliance on the USSR. However, the Soviet Union can be expected to try to bring cautious pressures to bear on the government of the UAR to keep it from following a course which would be counter to Soviet aims in the area.

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B. LEBANON

During the period under review political pressures increased in Lebanon and culminated in widespread disorders during May 1958. The opponents of the regime were supported in addition to UAR propaganda by Soviet propaganda which charged "Western imperialist" instigation. The local Communists have sought to profit from the disturbances and have cooperated with anti-regime forces, but have not taken the lead in the opposition movement. As some opposition element may be losing their enthusiasm for the continuation of the armed struggle, Communist elements may become more prominent among the perpetrators of acts of violence and of pressures to break the determination of the existing government to resist. Demands for the creation of a national unity government have been issued by the Communist Party, together with calls for solidarity with the UAR. Amalgamation of Lebanon into the UAR is, however, not being called for by Communist propaganda.

C. INDIA

The Communist Party of India (CPI) at its all-India Congress in April, the first in two years, made changes in its constitution and political program which on the surface make the party seem more like any other party in India. The new constitution omitted the open acknowledgment that the party is a part of the international Communist movement and modified the pattern of organization by increasing the size of the top national bodies and replacing functional terms that have undemocratic connotations -- the politburo and the cell. These structural changes, party leaders said, were a necessary sequel to the unexpected success of the CPI in the general elections of 1957 and were designed to enable the Party to operate more efficiently as a

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mass party capable of contesting future elections on an equal footing with the Congress Party. The relaxed membership requirements adopted by the Party in September 1957 were, however, dropped, indicating that in spite of emphasis on achieving broad voting strength, cadre development remains a major task of the Party. The purpose of the recent changes is to equip the Party for unity activities involving non-communist Indians who are dissatisfied with the Congress government's performance and favor a more outspoken stand on local popular grievances, but who have hitherto mistrusted the CPI's dependence on Moscow and its reliance on violence to gain its ends.

The CPI has not become independent of the international Communist movement. Though the new constitution has dropped the specific statement of support for international Communism, it says: "the CPI is guided by the philosophy and the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism... which alone show the toiling masses the correct way to put an end to domination of class by class and the establishment of a socialist society... [It] works out its policies by integrating the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the realities of the Indian situation... [It] draws on the rich experience of the International Working Class movement extending over more than a hundred years, on the experience of the Soviet Union, China, and all countries of People's Democracy, as well as of all Communist and Workers' Parties." CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh wrote in the party's monthly journal for February 1958: "We are a part of the international Communist movement. We are a part of the great fraternity of Communist and working-class parties which leads the battle of humanity for peace, for democracy and socialism. The program put forward in the Manifesto adopted by 64 parties in the momentous Moscow Conference has to be carried to

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our people and made the basis of a powerful mass campaign." The humiliating about-face made by the CPI on its attitude toward the Yugoslav Communist Party Congress in May after it had been informed of the attitude of the CPSU shows its continuing subservience to Moscow.

The CPI is not a revisionist party. The new constitution says only that the party "strives" to win power peacefully. As in the case of the Chinese Communists, the Party's pledge on civil rights is qualified. The new Party constitution guarantees under a Communist-built socialist society only "the widest possible extension of individual liberty, freedom of speech, press and association, and the right of political organization to all, including those in opposition to the government, as long as they abide by the constitution of the country." (underlining added). The last point ostensibly refers to the right of other parties to exist if the CPI were in power, but is based upon an implicit assumption that the Indian constitution which would then be in effect would require support by all parties for the building of "socialism," as does the constitution of Communist China.

The organizational changes, publicized during the Party's recent drive for new members as moves toward "democratization," thus mean little. As in the past, the new constitution says that the Party is organized on the principle of "democratic centralism," defined as "central leadership based on the full inner-party democracy under the guidance of centralized leadership." Other sections of the constitution make it clear that the "guidance of centralized leadership" still allows almost dictatorial control by the hierarchy and, in a showdown, hardly more "inner-party democracy" than in the past. Similarly, the much publicized abolition of the cell may have little meaning. Under the new constitution the branch rather than the cell is the primary unit of organization. Branches are to be established on a territorial

basis rather than by industry or other special interest group. The branch, however, "may be divided into groups of convenient sizes," and "group" may become another name for "cell."

The existence of a Communist government in Kerala since the 1957 election, is a major reason for the Party's attempts to present a constitutional face. The Communist ministry in Kerala can rule only so long as it abides by the national constitution. This restriction limits the ministry's freedom to use totalitarian methods to deal with the state's chronic problems of food and land shortages and unemployment. Yet the Kerala ministry must bring about enough improvement to convince the people that the Communist Party holds out more hope of progress than any other party. So far the ministry has not "solved" Kerala's basic problems and the people of the state are showing some signs of impatience. However, the Communist victory in a critical by-election in May shows that the opposition is not now strong enough to supplant the government. The Communist ministry has made a steady record of modest short-range accomplishments. It has raised the wages of several hundred thousand state employees and introduced numerous benefits for labor, increased efficiency in administrative procedures, reduced the pay of ministers, taken steps to root out corruption, and stopped evictions of poor tenants from lands they illegally occupy. Fiscal policy has not, however, provided a sound basis for these moves, and pressure is being applied to the central government for additional financial support of state programs. In dealing with the central government, the ministry has on the whole been accommodating and flexible. The Chief Minister, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, has made speeches and held press conferences throughout India and without fail has presented himself and his

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ministry as models of moderation. Criticism of the central government has, however, become sharper in recent months.

On the other hand the Kerala ministry's much publicized devotion to constitutionalism has not prevented the ministry and the Party from laying the groundwork for a Communist society. Administration at top levels has been centralized to give the ministers more direct authority, a number of important new state posts have been created and staffed with Communists, the proportion of Communists in the secretariat, police and teaching corps has increased, and numerous "advisory" boards with Communists in the majority have been established to deal with special problems. In some villages, "people's committees" with a predominance of Communists, set up with the ministry's encouragement, are superseding the authority of local government units. Communist-controlled trade unions are using intimidating tactics without police interference to build up their unions at the expense of non-Communist unions. All told, Communists have so entrenched themselves in the state's administration and services from top to bottom that they could not easily or quickly be dislodged if the present government fell, and the strengthened party organization would remain. Meanwhile, the publicity machinery of the state government and of the all-India Communist Party are being utilized to play up all achievements of the Kerala government, comparing them most favorably with those of other state governments even when in toto the Kerala record is less good. The importance the all-India Party attaches to increased decentralization of central governmental authority and to Kerala as a showpiece is shown by inclusion in the political resolution adopted at the April Congress of an injunction to Party units throughout the country to "publicize Kerala."

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For several months preceding the April Congress, organizational matters received considerable CPI attention. Provincial units held conferences to discuss the proposed changes in the Party constitution. CPI membership increased in a year from about 125,000 to 220,000, with the following states accounting for the largest number of members: Kerala, 56,000; Andhra, 52,000; West Bengal, 24,000; Madras, 20,000; Bihar, 16,381; Uttar Pradesh, 12,300; Punjab, 10,000; and Maharashtra, 9,000.

Asian-African solidarity has been a conspicuous Communist front theme. Recent CPI propaganda has concentrated on independence for Algeria, the ending of racial discrimination in South Africa, abandonment of nuclear tests, and the holding of a summit meeting. These demands were played up in Party publications, along with numerous articles praising Communist countries, and through front groups. Considerable publicity was given to the activities of various front "friendship" societies, including the Indo-China Friendship Society's third national conference in February 1958. The All-India Peace Council, which observed "Summit Conference Fortnight" in February, plans to broaden its aims so as to attract a wider variety of supporters.

The Bureau of the World Peace Council met in New Delhi in March 1958, with delegates from 28 countries attending, but what little publicity it received was unfavorable. Members of the Bureau who sought to remain in India to attend the CPI Congress in Amritsar were denied extension of their visas. The Communist-front Indian People's Theatre Association in March 1958, held a national conference and festival, with the participation of a number of prominent Indians interested in developing Indian arts, including the Vice

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President. The student and youth fronts do not seem to be carrying out a well-planned nationwide program. They demonstrate and agitate sporadically, mainly in behalf of local grievances.

Generally the CPI is apparently continuing to concentrate on the special-interest group of traditional interest to Communist Parties -- the trade unions. The Communist-controlled All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) is a major arm of party activity in urban areas, where the party is strongest. It was important in turning out the Communist vote in the 1957 elections, and is headed by a prominent member of the CPI high command, S. A. Dange, who is also a force in Bombay politics and a key figure in the WFTU. AITUC is making headway among trade unions, though Congress and socialist-oriented unions now number twice as many members as Communist unions.

Apart from Kerala, the most serious Communist threat in the labor field is developing on the tea plantations of Assam and in the state-owned heavy industries being built in eastern India, and in defense industries. The Communist unions, anticipating a great increase in the number of state employees to man these large industries, are making government workers, clerical as well as industrial, a major target. It is significant that among the five states having the largest AITUC membership, three of the four, other than Kerala, are those in which Communists hope to come to power.

The Communist peasant front is weak and ineffectual in most areas, though it is reviving in Madras and is strong in Kerala. The membership of this front, the All-India Kisan Sabha, according to its own figures has dropped from more than one million in 1954-55 to about 600,000 during the past year. The Party high command after years of neglect of this important

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segment of the population has as of August 1957 launched a new campaign to enlist peasant support through a program encouraging the buildup of co-operatives with the fiscal support of the central government. The CPI, though preoccupied with its own problems, still acts as older brother to the Communist Party of East Pakistan.

VI. COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN MEMBER STATES OF THE PACT AREA AND IN JORDAN.

In the member countries of the area Communist activities continued to be contained. The Arab Union between Iraq and Jordan has been attacked by Soviet propaganda as being "dominated by imperialists" and "obstructing the path of Arab nationalism."

VII. OUTLOOK

The strategy of the Soviet Union and of the International Communist Movement in the Treaty area is not likely to undergo basic modification during the next six months unless external events force a change. The USSR is likely to continue to stress state to state relationships, trade and "aid without strings." The Bloc will be anxious to consolidate the economic gains it has made, and as long as the Soviets see any possibility of political returns they will continue to press for technical exchanges and training, and will tailor their trade policies, as far as feasible, toward undercutting the West. Bloc economic aid will also continue to be exploited for propaganda purposes, and attractive-sounding offers will continue to be made for propaganda purposes or to induce countries, which have not already done so, to establish economic relations with the Bloc.

The renewal of the ideological conflict between the Bloc and Yugoslavia and its political implications may well have increasing repercussions in the

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Treaty area, particularly if the dispute should become increasingly bitter. Local fellow travelers and party members who are not fully indoctrinated supporters of Moscow might become alarmed at the insistence of the International Communist Movement on requiring conformity and passive acceptance of local setbacks in the interest of the broader aims of Soviet international policy. The dispute will also provide opportunities to show the real aims of the Soviet Union in the area and the utilization of the International Communist Movement by the USSR for purposes of Soviet expansion and domination.

While the USSR has for the present accepted the UAR and the relegation of the Syrian Communist Party to an inferior role, the Soviets can be expected to try to maintain Communist cadres, if necessary underground, in both regions of the UAR and to exert pressures of various kinds upon the UAR Government to move that Government further along policy lines of benefit to the USSR. In this program the Chinese Communist Party and state are likely to play a leading role. Current Chinese Communist activity vis-a-vis the Arab Confederation of Trade Unions is likely to be of particular significance in this respect. In its propaganda the Bloc can be expected to continue to support Nasir and extreme Arab anti-Western nationalism and to attack governments friendly to or associated with the West. The Soviet Union also is likely to continue to exploit, diplomatically and through propaganda, all conflicts which may arise in the area in order to discredit the policies of the West and of states associated with the West.

The USSR and the International Communist Movement can also be expected to try to use Afro-Asian gatherings and organizations, where feasible, for the promotion of Soviet and Communist goals.